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ABSTRACT
To improve Hungarian e-governance capabilities by developing new IT services, the Hungarian Government has spent
more than one hundred million Euros since 2010. As the base pillars of the Hungarian Digital  State, a number of
Controlled Electronic Administration Services (CEAS) have been implemented. The usability of any digital system
which  can  be  linked  to  trust  depends  on  the  authenticity  of  stored  and processed  information.  Using unauthentic
information may result in fraudulent activities, which should be avoided in the Administration. Electronic signatures are
methods of authentication as defined by the 93/1999 Directive, and tools of strong identification as specified by the new
regulation.
The European Union enacted the Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council called
eIDAS.  in  September  of  2014.  eIDAS  contains  comprehensive  and  obligatory  rules  for  applying  electronic
identification and electronic signature in Europe. It is the continuation of 93/1999 EU Directive, therefore addressing
this topic is expected in IT projects in 2015.
The examination was performed on IT projects coordinated by the Hungarian Governmental – Information Technology
Development Agency. The analysis focuses on three questions:
1. Is electronic signature technology applied in project administration?
2. Which electronic signature attributes appear in the final results of the projects?
3. What kind of electronic signature dimensions appear in the projects?
The  presentation  summarizes  the  main  attributes  of  the  examined  projects,  describes  conceptual  definitions  of
authenticity, gives a brief introduction into the electronic signature dimensions, and formulates conclusions about the
success and lack of applying electronic signature elements in Hungarian Governmental IT projects.
INTRODUCTION TO AUTHENTICITY
EESSI Final Report (EESSI, 1999) stated that “an 'electronic signature' without being further qualified, is indeed an
electronic authentication. The term 'authentication' itself is not defined nor explained in the recitals of the (93/1999 EU)
Directive and thus leaves room for a broad interpretation. However, the term is usually defined as 'validation of a
claimed identity'.  Every type of electronic authentication will  be regarded as an electronic signature,  as long as  it
attached to or associated in a logical way with other electronic data.”. It is not a surprise that definition of electronic
signature in 93/1999 EU Directive is the following: “data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated
with other data in electronic form and which serve as a method of authentication”. eIDAS Regulation (910/2014 EU
Regulation) gives a very simple definition for it: “data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated
with other data in electronic form and which is used by the signatory to sign”. This definition is not a technological
dependent therefore several implementation has been deployed with different parameters. Consequently, implementing
electronic  signature  systems  requires  deep  and  broad  knowledge  about  dimensions  and  parameters  of  electronic
signatures.
DIMENSIONS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
Dimension means a set of attributes from which only one can belong to an electronic signature in a unique manner. If an
electronic signature is defined exactly, all relevant dimensions will have to known and the appropriate value from each
dimension will have to assign to the given signature. Between relevant dimensions may occur dependencies. Dimension
analysis should perform to define these interdependencies correctly. The independent dimensions are called orthogonal.
The examined dimensions are the following:
Dimension 1: Formalization  (CAdES:  CMS  based  Advanced  Electronic  Signature,  XAdES:  XML-based
Advanced Electronic Signature and PAdES: PDF-based based Advanced Electronic Signature
Dimension 2: Type of Signature (normal, advanced and qualified
Dimension 3: Probative force (evidence at court, partial probative force, full probative force)
Dimension 4: Complexity  (basic,  extended  policy  based,  timestamped,  complex,  extended,  extended  long,
archive, long term valid)
Dimension 5: Validity Period (immediately, short time, long time)
Dimension 6: Certificate Standard (PGP, X509, other)
Dimension 7: Type  of  Certificate  (qualified,  non  qualified,  signature,  seal,  usable  in  Hungarian  Public
Administration)
Dimension 8: Type of Signatory (end entity including natural person, code signer, automaton, certificate authority
including  root,  bridge,  intermediate  or  certificate  issuer,  time-stamping  authority,  archiving  authority,  OCSP
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provider etc.) 
Dimension 9: Signature Algorithms (e.g. AES, TDEA, GOST, RSA, DSA, ECDSA)
Dimension 10: Length of Signature Creation Data (usually it is given in bits – 128, 256, 1024, 2048, 4096...)
Dimension 11: Storage of Signature Creation Data (encrypted container file, hardware token including Hardware
Security Module, Secure Signature Creation Device or simple Signature Creation Device, SIM card, pen drive) 
Dimension 12: Placement of Signatures (single, multiple including sequential, parallel,  countersign, embedding,
embedded, detached or mixed)
Dimension 13: Type of Certificate Authority (public, closed group, home made)
Dimensions can be categorized by types of connections, some of them connect to signatures, others relate to certificates,
in the other words, dimensions may be classified by functional point of view. Next figure visualises this picture: 
Figure 1: Classifying dimensions of electronic signature by functional aspects (created by author)
LIST OF PROJECTS
The  Governmental  IT  Development  Agency  (GIDA)  coordinates  several  IT  projects  in  Hungarian  Public
Administration. The scope of this research contains 16 projects which started and performed between 2010 and 2014.
Summarized budget of all examined projects was more than 38 billion Hungarian Forint (121 million Euros). It does not
contain budgets of those IT projects which were coordinated by another governmental organization. The following
information were gathered:
 Project code: short acronym created by first letters of words of project name
 Project name: short description of the project
 Project ID: Hungarian ID of project
 Started: The year when the project was initialized
 Finished: The year when the projects was deployed
 Budget (EUR): spent money in Euros
Details of the examined projects is listed in the next table:
Project code Project name Project ID Started Finished Budget (EUR)
1 1AVAM Implementation of single customs administration
EKOP 1.2.2-07-
2008-0001 2008 2010 7 692 000
2 ACM Implementation of 
taxpayer-oriented data 
EKOP 1.2.7-2008-
0001
2009 2011 4 166 500
Project code Project name Project ID Started Finished Budget (EUR)
model
3 ASP
Initialization of a 
Centralized Application 
Service Provider Centre 
for Local Governments
EKOP 3.1.6-2012-
2012-0001 2012 2015 8 333 500
4 E-FIZ Implementation of central electronic payment system
EKOP 2.1.1-07-
2008-0001 2008 2013 12 777 600
5 EFER Conn
Implementation of 
activities related to 
organizational connections 
with central electronic 
payment and settlement 
system (EFER)
EKOP-2.A.3-2013-
2013-0002 2014 2014 320 500
6 E-SZTENDERDEK
Governmental standards 
for IT services and e-
government functions
ÁROP 1.1.17-
2012-2012-0001 2012 2013 641 0001
7 ESR
ESR-112 Single 
emergency calling system 
based on an emergency 
number
EKOP 2.1.12-
2011-2012-0001 2012 2014 17 450 000
8 FAIR Single IT support of the development policy
EKOP 1.2.12-
2011-2011-0001 2011 2013 7 468 000
9 GSM-R FEM GSM-R State supervising engineer
KÖZOP-6.1.1-
11/K-2013-0001 2013 2015 2 404 000
10 KGR Government budget management system
EKOP 1.2.1.-07-
2008-001 2007 2013 14 263 500
11 KKIR2
Institutional Accounting 
Module (IKM-FI) 
subproject
EKOP-1.2.4-2013-
2013-0001 2013 2014 961 500
12 OTR Countrywide support monitoring system
EKOP-1.2.11-
2013-2013-0001 2013 2014 2 564 250
13 TÉBA Modernization of the payment of family benefits
EKOP 1.2.6-2008-
0001 2009 2013 5 367 000
14 INTÉZMÉNY-KÖZI
IT systems development 
for centralized, inter-
institutional data flow
TIOP 2.3.1. 2013 2014 8 880 750
15 KATÉTER ÉSMÓNIKA
Nationwide health 
monitoring and capacity 
map database and 
application development
TÁMOP 6.2.3/12-
1-2012-0001 2013 2014 3 205 000
16 KÖZHITELES Electronic public registers and sectoral portals
TIOP 2.3.2-12/1-
2013-0001 2013 2014 6 730 500
17 OEP
Development of customer 
relationships in Health 
Insurance and 
implementing data 
management and 
identification integrated 
into health information 
systems
EKOP 2.3.7-2012-
2012-0001 2013 2014 8 972 000
18 EDR
EDR development – 
Development of Single 
Digital 
Radiocommunication 
System (EDR)
EKOP 2.2.7-2013-
2013-0001 2013 2014 9 612 750
Table 1: List of examined projects (created by author based on http://kifu.gov.hu webpage)
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH
There  are  couple  of  research  regarded  to  Hungarian  ICT  projects.  For  instance  ICT projects  also  examined  by
researchers focused on the policy objectives and project deliverables, not on execution and actual results (ARANYOSSI
et. al., 2014). Security consideration of ICT projects is an other important aspect of examination.
Performing of my research includes two main direction, reviewing of projects documentation and interviewing with
project managers and related professionals. I try to identify any PKI element in project documentation in designing
phase and ask project managers about appearing these elements both in administration and in results of the projects
(deploying phase). Measuring IT security is a complex task (MUHA, 2010) and needs some formalization. To formalize
my results, research worksheet is specified for examining certificates, time stamps, signatures and archiving solutions.
The worksheet contains the following elements:
1. certificate
a) PGP signing certificate
b) non-qualified signing certificate
c) qualified signing certificate
d) enciphering certificate
e) authentication certificate
f) SSL certificate
g) qualified SSL certificate
h) code signing certificate
2. time stamp
a) qualified time stamp
b) non-qualified time stamp
3. signature
a) normal personal PKI signature
b) advanced personal signature
c) qualified personal signature
d) normal seal
e) advanced seal
f) qualified seal
4. archiving services
a) qualified archiving service
b) non-qualified archiving service
c) other archiving service
Main goal of this research is to identify used PKI elements of the examined IT projects because electronic signature
appears as one of three basic functions of e-government in Hungary.
DISCUSSING
Based on project  documentation and  performed interviews  lack  of  PKI elements  can  be stated in  most  examined
projects. Governmental Certificate Service Provider as a CEAS (henceforward: GOVCA) issued several certificates for
the Governmental Agency, but most certificates (88,46%) were used for implementing only the central financial service
(EFER). Detailed distribution of owners can be seen in the next table:
Certificate owner Count
EFER project 115
Employees of Agency (12 authentication 
certificates + 1 signature certificate)
13
Developers (for testing purposes) 2
Total value: 130
Table 2: GOVCA issued certificates grouped by owners (created by author)
The intended usage of PKI element was an other interesting question of this research. It can be derived from the applied
types  of  PKI  elements.  The  questionnaire  was  prepared  by  eIDAS and Hungarian  Electronic  Signature  Act.  The
interviewed persons and examined documentation give an early result which is conformed by issued certificates:
Type of Certificates Count
organizational signing certificate (seal) 1
organizational mass signing certificate 
(automaton seal) 1
organizational authentication certificate 75
organizational SSL certificate (client and 26
server)
organizational code signing certificate 27
Total value: 130
Table 3: GOVCA issued certificates grouped by types (created by author)
Note that this status was recorded at December 21, 2015 and each project manager have not interviewed yet.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on interviews and examined project documentation, it can be stated that there are no electronic signatures  in any
documentation of projects neither in creating nor in archiving phases. However, EFER project uses most certificates
issued by GOVCA, because it has a commonly used financial part and electronic signature technology is an external
requirement in electronic banking transactions nowadays. Furthermore digital certificates only use for authenticating
and testing purposes typically according to the results of the current phase of the research. Based on project managers'
general opinion and partial results of this research it is presumable that using electronic signature technology has not
integrated into developing, performing, deploying and documenting Hungarian e-government projects yet, but more
research need to prove it undoubtedly.
The reason of low intention to use electronic signatures in governmental IT projects requires further research, but it is
known factors that the Governmental Certificate Authority started at the end of 2013 and a bit of employees have PKI
engineering  knowledge  as  PKI  usage  experiences  both  in  public  administration  and  commercial  companies.
Furthermore we can see from statistical data of National Media- and Infocommunications Authority that using PKI
certificates is not typical among governmental players. The popular argumentation of electronic signature – it is more
expensive and too complex – may result this behaviour in public administration but we cannot ignore its increasing
usage in commercial sector during this time.
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